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We explore the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa. Controlling for a wide range of 
economic, demographic, geographic and istitutional regressors, we find that institutions, and  in 
particular the civil liberties index and the number of revolutions, are the main determinants of 
fragility, even taking into account their potential endogeneity. Economic factors such as income 
growth and investment display a non robust impact after controlling for omitted variables and 
reverse causality.  Colonial variables reflecting the history of the region display a marginal impact 
on fragility once institutions are accounted for.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of state fragility (from now on, fragility) has recently reached center stage in the debate 
on economic development, and in particular on the development prospects of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). The concept of fragility has been associated with various combinations of the following 
dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak 
governance, a persistent condition of extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high 
propensity to conflict and civil war. The crucial relevance of fragility for SSA countries is 
motivated by the fact that they are overrepresented among fragile states, with drastic consequences 
on the eligibility of the region to substantial aid flows.  
 
Several studies have examined the influence of the condition of fragility on development, either 
through its direct impact on income and growth, or through its indirect influence through aid 
allocation. In a growth regression framework,  Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) find that for SSA a 
conventional definition of fragility is a not a significant covariate once standard regressors are 
accounted for. For a comparable sample, Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) shows that the impact of fragility 
on per capita income interacts with several other factors: in fragile countries, beyond a threshold 
level trade openness may actually be harmful to income, while small improvements in political 
institutions can have adverse effects. In Fosu (2009) the absence of policy syndromes encourages 
growth in SSA, but only one component of these syndromes, state breakdown, has to do with 
fragility. Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that aid is most effective in developing 
countries with sound institutions and policies, even if this conclusion is challenged by Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004).  McGillivray e Feeny (2008), for a world sample of fragile 
countries find that, while growth would have been slower in the absence of aid, at the same time 
these countries can only efficiently absorb a fraction of  the aid flows. Finally, Chauvet e Collier 
(2007) analyze the preconditions for sustained policy turnarounds in failing states and show that   3
financial aid can prolonge state failure, while aid through technical assistance can shorten it. 
Overall, a clear impact of fragility on economic outcomes has proved hard to assess. One possible 
explanation for the absence of a clear causal lin running from fragility to development is the 
endogeneity of fragility, or else the presence of a common third factor that determines both fragility 
and development itself.  
 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the potential determinants of fragility, by 
explicitly taking into account its potential endogeneity with respect to other relevant economic and 
non-economic factors. We shall focus our attention on SSA, for two reasons. The first reason is that 
as previously explained this issue is particularly important for policy intervention in this region. The 
second reason is that fragility has proven such a multi-faceted issue that to concentrate on a 
specific, relatively homogeneous area may lead to more meaningful conclusions. At the same time, 
it is recognized that, especially within SSA, fragile states are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of 
their economic, social, geographic and political characteristics. The European Report on 
Development (2009), which is entirely devoted to the problem of fragility in Africa, assembles a 
full array of stylized facts that confirms this heterogeneity.  
 
The variables which we include in our investigation, as potentially relevant for Africa’s economic 
and institutional performance, and therefore also for fragility in the region, are chosen among those 
which have been found relevant within the literature on growth and institutional development. We 
select a wide range of economic, demographic, geographic and istitutional regressors, following 
Bertocchi and Canova (2002), who assemble a dataset for Africa, in turn drawing on Barro (1991). 
We include, first of all, income and its growth rate. The only other empirical study on the 
determinants of fragility is Carment et al. (2008) who find, over a world sample, that per capita 
income level is the main factor, with higher income being associated to lower fragility. However, it 
should be kept in mind that the sign of tis effect is by no means mechanical since, especially in   4
SSA, relatively wealthy societies have often been plagued by corruption and predation activities 
that can generate instability and dysfuntions, and thus increase fragility.  
 
Without neglecting to control for additional economic and demographic factors, next we focus our 
attention on institutions. Non-quantitative studies in the field of political sciences and applied 
development have pointed to institutions as the central driver of fragility. Vallings and Moreno-
Torres (2005) argue that any other factor commonly associated with fragility is itself  linked to 
weak institutions. For instance, while  poverty is certainly linked to fragility, not all poor areas turn 
out to be fragile, since fragility occurs only when poverty is combined with the presence of a weak 
state that cannot manage manage effectively the causes and consequences of poverty itself. 
Therefore, we assess empirically the potential relevance of institutions. 
 
In the literature on Africa, a lot of attention has been devoted to the role of history, and in particular 
of colonial history. Africa represents an appropriate setting for analyzing the impact of colonial rule 
because, historically, nowhere else was colonization so far-reaching as in the African experience 
that began at the end of the 19th century. There is a shared perception that fragility, as well as other 
dysfuntions such as corruption and ethnic conflict, might find its roots in the legacy of colonization. 
The European Development Report (2009) supports this perception by stressing the common 
characteristics of state formation in this region: its artificial character following decolonization, the 
extractive nature of colonial domination, the political and economic  dependence from the 
metropolitan power,  and the system of indirect rule. The literature on colonial influence has 
developed along two separate although complementary strands. One stresses the identity of the 
colonizers, while another points at the conditions in the colonies. Within the first strand, La Porta et 
al. (1998) have focused on the legal systems inherited by the colonies, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) 
on the nationality of the colonizers, Hall and Jones (1999) on the extent to which the primary 
languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages today. Together with Landes (1998) and   5
North et al. (1998),  these contributions tend to agree on the conclusion that former British colonies 
inherited better institutions than the former colonies of France, Spain and Portugal. Within the 
second strand, Acemoglu et al. (2001) develop an alternative theory of institutional development 
which emphasizes the conditions in the colonies, and in particular settler mortality. The latter is 
employed as an instrument for current institutions, as measured by the risk of expropriation, in the 
effort to explain how institutions affect income. This approach is closely related to Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997), who link institutions to factor endowments. Building on this literature, in order to 
investigate the historical determinants of fragility we exploit the information on colonization by 
introducing a number of colonial variables that reflect both the approaches described above: 
therefore, we evaluate the impact of the national identity of the colonizer (Britain vs. France vs. 
Portugal),  the political status of the dominated countries (colonies vs. dependencies vs. independent 
countries), and settler mortality. Using this information, we follow two parallel empirical strategies. 
First, in an effort to alleviate the omitted variable problem,  we include the colonial variables in an 
expanded list of possible determinants of fragility. Second, we try to exploit colonial history as a 
source of suitable instruments, in order to control for endogeneity. 
 
In more detail, we organize our empirical investigation as follows. We consider a sample of 41 SSA 
countries. Our dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 is a country is fragile, 0 
otherwise. While we have information on fragility only over the 1999-2007 period, we have earlier 
information for all our regressors. Therefore, to extend the period under consideration as much as 
possible,  we organize our dataset as a panel over two subperiods, 1992-1999 and 2000-2007. The 
dependent variable reflects fragility in the final years of the subperiods, i.e., 1999 and 2007, while 
for the regressors we employ average values over the subperiods. Among economic factors, we 
consider per capita GDP (which we consider both in terms of levels and growth rates), investment, 
government expenditures, a measure of human capital given by primary enrollments, a measure of 
trade openness, and inflation. We also introduce demographic factors, namely, life expectancy and   6
the fertility rate, as well as the index of ethnic fractionalization. Finally, to capture the quality of 
institutions, we select civil liberties and revolutions.  
 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find that institutional variables are the key 
determinants of fragility: the probability for a country to be fragile decreases  with the level of civil 
liberties and increases with the number of revolutions. Economic determinants such as per capita 
GDP growth and investment, which show some explanatory power in pooled regressions, lose 
significance once we exploit the panel dimension of the dataset. Among our colonial variables, we  
find a mild positive impact only for British colonization, while French and Portuguese colonization, 
political status and settler mortality do not improve our understanding of the determinants of 
fragility, once standard contemporary  measures of institutional quality are taken into account. 
Geography, as captured by latitude and a dummy for being  landlocked, is equally insignificant. 
When we address the endogeneity problem we find that colonial variables are very weak 
instruments for all the potentially endogenous significant variables. Once we instrument them with 
their initial values, civil liberties and revolutions are confirmed once again as the only exogenous 
determinants of fragility. Finally, we also expand our perspective to the entire post-war period by 
reorganizing our data as a cross sectional dataset, where an average measure of fragility over 1999-
2007 is regressed over average values of the regressors for 1960-1998. Over this longer run 
perspective, the impact of civil liberties becomes non-linear, with fragility being associated to 
extreme values of the index, while revolutions lose significance.  Per capita income, on the other 
hand, appears to be positively associated with fragility, while colonial variables are unable to add 
explanatory power.  
 
To sum up, after controlling for omitted variables and endogeneity, we find that institutions prevail 
on economic factors as the central drivers of fragility in Africa, confirming the intuition in Vallings 
and Moreno-Torres (2005). Whenever economic factors play a role, it often runs  in the direction of   7
making fragility more likely under good economic performances, contrary to what Carment et al. 
(2008) find for a world sample. Contrary to common perception, colonial history exerts a very 
marginal contribution to  the determination of  todays’ fragility, with British colonies as the only 
significant variable. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the definition of fragility and 
describes our dataset. Section 3 presents our empirical findings. Section 4 concludes and suggests 




The concept of fragility is an elusive one. Failure, vulnerability and weakness have often been used 
as synonimous of fragility, by the Fund for Peace, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the Brookings Institution, respectively. Fragility itself has been defined in 
several different manners by various international organizations. For example, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development defines as  fragile those states where the government 
cannot or will not deliver core functions to its people. According to the World Bank, fragile states 
are defined as low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below (over a 1-6 range) on the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
defines as fragile states those countries in the bottom two CPIA quintiles, as well as those which are 
not rated.
1 Since CPIA ratings are publicly available only since 2005, for the purposes of our 
empirical investigation we use the OECD-DAC information about the distribution of the 
                                                 
1 Other related indexes are the Failed State Index, the  Index of State Weakness, the indicator of 
Failed & Fragile States, and the Fragility States Index, respectively published by the Fund for 
Peace, the Brookings Institution, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), and Polity IV. 
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International Development Association (IDA)
2 member countries by CPIA quintiles, which is 
available from 1999 until 2007. 
 
CPIA ratings are prepared annually by World Bank staff and are intended to capture the quality of a 
country’s policies and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the key elements that are within 
the country’s control, rather than on outcomes (such as growth rates) that are influenced by 
elements outside the country’s control.  Scores are assigned on the basis of 16 criteria (20 until 
2003) which are grouped in four equally weighted clusters:  Economic Management, Structural 
Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and Public Sector Management and Institutions. 
The ratings reflect a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments based on country 
knowledge, originated in the Bank or elsewhere, and on relevant publicly available indicators.  
 
For our purposes, to refer to the CPIA ratings offers three advantages. First, the ratings have a 
crucial practical relevance, since they significantly influence the Bank’s concessional lending and 
grants allocated through the IDA according to a specific formula. Second, information on their 
distribution by quintiles is now  available for a relatively extended time period, i.e., from 1999 to 
2007. Third, because of their design, they do not reflect mechanically  any of the variables we 
employ as regressors, so that they can safely be  employed to define our dependent variable.   
 
We construct a dataset including those 41 sub-Saharan countries for which we have information on 
the CPIA ratings distribution by quintiles. For these countries, we construct a fragility dummy 
variable, which takes value 1 if a country belongs to the bottom two CPIA quintiles or if it is not 
rated, 0 otherwise. The variables which we include as regressors are the following. Among 
economic factors, we consider per capita GDP (both in terms of levels and growth rates), 
                                                 
2 IDA is the part of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest countries. Established in 1960, its 
aim is to reduce poverty by providing interest-free credits and grants. It currently represents one of 
the largest sources of assistance for the world’s 79 poorest countries, 39 of which are in Africa.   9
investment, government expenditures, a measure of human capital given by primary enrollments, a 
measure of trade openness, and inflation. For the variables listed so far, intuition may suggest that 
good economic performances, in all these dimensions, should reduce the likelihood of fragility. 
However, this intuition has actually been challenged in seveal contexts. We also introduce 
demographic factors, such as life expectancy and the fertility rate, as well as the index of ethnic 
fractionalization which, as suggested by work by Easterly and Levine (1997), could contribute to 
fragility. To capture the quality of institutions, we select the civil liberties index and the number of 
revolutions, even though we also consider alternatives such as political rights and three of the 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) governance indicators, namely government effectiveness, rule of law, and  
voice and accountability. To be noticed is that the civil liberties index is contructed in such a way 
that a higher value is associated with fewer civil liberties. The impact of civil liberties on fragility is 
a priori ambiguous: while on the one hand  autocracies intrinsically feed fragility, on the other very 
liberal democracies may also prove to be vulnerable to political and economic disorder. Revolutions 
and other episodes of acute political unrest, on the other hand, are likely to represent a threat to 
stability, even though in principle that they could also represent a reaction to dysfunctions and thus 
a prelude to a new, more stable order. As in Bertocchi and Canova (2002), our colonial variables are 
the following: a set of dummies for British, French and Portuguese colonies, respectively, and a 
dummy capturing the political status during the colonial period, which takes value 2 for colonies, 1 
for dependencies, and 0 for independent countries. In addition, from Acemoglu et al. (2001) we take 
settler mortality. Finally, our geographic variables are latitude and a dummy for being landlocked 
(see Sachs and Warner, 1997). More details are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
For most of the empirical investigation, the available data are organized as a panel covering the 
1992-2007 period and composed of  two cross sections, over 1992-99 and 2000-07. The dependent 
variable is the fragility dummy in 1999 and 2007, i.e., in the final year of each cross section. For 
each regressor, we consider their average value in 1992-99 e 2000-07. This approach is meant to   10
maximize the length of the period of observation, given the limited range of the information on 
fragility. By organizing the available data in this way, we were able to extend the investigation back 
to 1992, even though information on fragility is only available from 1999. Moreover, by treating as 
dependent variable fragility in the final year of each subperiods, we are able to mitigate the reverse 
causality problem running from fragility itself to the regressors. It has to be noticed, however, that 
data on some of the regressors are not available until 2007. Income data, for instance, are only 
available until 2004.  
 
Table. 1.  Summary statistics 
 
Variable    Obs.   Mean  Median Min  Max  Standard 
deviation
Fragility 82  0.51  1  0  1  0.50 
pc GDP   81  1438,19  1044,46 274,98  10118,06  1311,84 
pc GPD growth   80  1.24  0.67  -8.97  24.74  4.89 
Investment  81  8.71 7.52 2.33 34.97 6.01 
Primary  enrollment  81 82.07 76.48 10.03 193.83 30.35 
Government expenditures  81  24.51  21.37  2.60  85.59  13.79 
Trade  81 67.66 58.69 2.02  181.18 35.84 
Inflation 79  100.33  7.69  1.51  3945.13  492.29 
Life expectancy  82  50.85  50.23  30.15  69.96  7.05 
Fertility  rate  82  5,72  5,77  3,68 7,72 0,94 
Ethnic  fractionalization  80  0.69  0.74  0.00 0.93 0.21 
Civil  liberties  82  4.57  4.56  1.38 7.00 1.26 
Revolutions  82  0.30  0.00  0.00 1.33 0.39 
British Colony  82  0.32  0  0  1  0.47 
French Colony  82  0.39  0  0  1  0.49 
Portuguese Colony  82  0.12  0  0  1  0.33 
Political status  72  1.83  2  0  2  0.50 
Settler mortality   50  544,36  280  26  2940  654,19 
Latitude  82  10,53  10,40  0,42 29,69 6,38 
Landlock 82  0.32  0  0  1  0.47 
Government  effectiveness  82  2.64  2.69  1.41 3.61 0.50 
Rule of law  82  2.61  2.65  1.23  4.18  0.58 
Voice and accountability  82  2.74  2.65  1.53  4.26  0.65 
        Notes: Panet dataset. The panel is composed of two cross sections, over the 1992-99 and the 




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in our dataset. The (unreported) pairwise 
correlations among our variables show that fragility is highly correlated with civil liberties (0,50)   11
and revolutions (0,44), while the correlation with economic variables is much lower (e.g., -0,14 
with per capita GDP growth). The correlation coefficients between fragility and the Kauffman et al. 




3.1. Basic specification 
 
Throughout subsections 3.1 to 3.3, we perform our regression analysis on the panel dataset 
composed of two cross sections, for 1992-99 and 2000-07 respectively. The regressors are averages 
over the two subperiods of 1992-99 and 2000-07 and the  dependent variable is the fragility dummy 
in 1999 and 2007. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, we start by running 
probit regressions with robust standard errors at the country level. The dependent variable has 
therefore to be interpreted as the probability that a country is fragile. Among the regressors, we 
include the main economic and institutional variables that have been found relevant in the literature 
on growth and institutions, whose potential role has been discussed in the previous section. Results 
are reported in Table 2, column 1, where we find that, among economic variables, the most 
significant one is GDP growth, which exerts a negative impact on the probability to be a fragile 
country. Investment is also marginally significant, with a somewhat surprising positive impact 
which may be attributed to an interaction between its effect and that of other covariates.
3 The other 
economic and demographic variables we consider do not provide additional explanatory power to 
the regression. However, the two institutional variables are highly significant and with a positive 
                                                 
3 An unreported variant of the same regression, which  includes an interaction between investment 
and civil liberties, shows a negative marginal effect for investment and a positive one for the 
interaction, suggesting that the expected negative impact of investment on fragility may turn 
positive in countries with bad institutions, which are the majority in the sample. This non linear 
effect can be explained by the fact that conflict, corruption and predation activities may intensify in 
relatively wealthy societies, because of the resource curse.  
   12
sign: namely, a higher value of the civil liberties index (i.e., more limited civil liberties) and a 
higher frequency of revolutions both make fragility more likely. An analogous regression including 




The results from the basic probit specification are also robust to an alternative pooled OLS 
estimation, presented in column 2, where GDP growth loses some of its significance. In columns 3 
and 4 we exploit the panel dimension of the dataset, in order to control for the potential omission of 
variables through country and time effects. We opt for random effects at the country level since, 
given our limited sample size, fixed effects would induce a serious loss of degrees of freedom and 
the danger of multicollinearity. In column 3 the only two significant covariates are civil liberties 
and revolutions. The same results emerge in column 4 where time effects are also considered, i.e., 
where a period dummy is inserted to reflect the time series dimension of the sample. To be noticed 
is that the period dummy displays a positive and highly significant effect, pointing to an 
intensification of fragility in the second subperiod.
5 We can therefore conclude that, when we 
control for the potential omission of variables through random country effects and time effects, 
institutions emerge as the only determinants of fragility, while other covariates such as income 








                                                 
4 An alternative specification including political rights, in place of civil liberties, yields similar 
results even though the impact of political rights is estimated less precisely. Isham et al. (1997) also 
find that civil liberties are more closely associated than political rights to the ability of  governments 
to exercise public decisions and authority.  
 
5 Similar results (which we omit for brevity) are obtained from probit specifications with added 
appropriate dummies.   13
Table 2. The determinants of fragility  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Regressor Probit

















pc GDP (log)  0,2321 
(0,4813) 
0,1605     
(0,1006) 










-0,0153    
(0,0139) 






0,0215*   
(0,0113) 
0,0070    
(0,0124) 






























-9,3259e-05   
(0,0025) 






-3,5146e-05   
(4,1752e-05)
-3,1051e-05   
(9,4670e-05)
-1,8955e-05   
(9,2208e-05) 
-6,9870e-05   
(4,7542e-05)
Life expectancy  0,0093 
(0,0422) 








Fertility rate (log)  0,4812 
(1,6306) 
0,1118     
(0,3746) 
-0,2473      
(0,4403) 








0,2062      
(0,3320) 
0,3231      
(0,3585) 








0,2083***    
(0,0527) 








0,3162*     
(0,1601) 








2 0,46       
Adjusted R
2 0,21  0,36 0,25 0,30 0,29 
Observations  75 75 75 75 75 
Notes: Panet dataset. 
a Marginal effects.  
b Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
c Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
d The instruments are the values of all regressors  at the beginning of each subperiod, 
i.e., in 1992 and 2000, respectively.  * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. 
 
The results presented so far need to be taken with caution, since our investigation is plagued by two 
major concerns: that for omitted variables, which we preliminarly address above with country and 
time effects, and that for endogeneity, which remains even if our dependend variable is constructed 
as the value of fragility in the final year of each cross section. To some extent, the two problems are 
actually linked, since  the relationship between fragility and the selected regressors may be driven,   14
rather than by direct causality, by an exogenous third factor which we have failed to include.   
However, in the discussion below we address each question separately. 
 
3.2. Extended specifications 
 
We reexamine the omitted variables issue by focusing, first of all, on the role of history, and in 
particular colonial history, which we have so far ignored. The potential impact of the colonial 
heritage within the literature on development and institutions has followed two parallel strands. One 
stresses the identity of the colonizers, while another points at the environmental conditions in the 
colonies. We exploit both strands, by experimenting with a set of colonial variables which reflect 
the two approaches. In particular, following Bertocchi and Canova (2002) we consider a set of three 
dummies capturing the national identity of the colonizers (namely, Britain, France, or Portugal), as 
well as a dummy for political status which distinguished among colonies, dependencies and 
independent countries (where the dummy takes value 2, 1, or 0, respectively). Moreover, following 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), we evaluate the potential role of settler mortality (in log) as a proxy of 
environmental conditions. We add each of these additional covariates, one by one, to the basic 
probit regression of Table 2, column 1. Results from the extended specifications are presented in 
Table 3. We find that the dummies for British (column 1) and French (column 2) colonies are 
significant and with opposite signs, which suggests that having being a British colony decreases the 
probability of being a fragile country, while the opposite occurs for French colonies. The relatively 
beneficial impact of British colonial domination confirms findings of several other studies, 
including Bertocchi and Canova (2002).  However, the recognition of these factors does not alter 
the basic message regarding the impact of growth and institutions. The Portuguese colony dummy 
(column 3), as well as the dummy for political status (column 4), do not add any explicatory value 
to the basic regression. Including the latter, ethnic fractionalization emerges as one of the   15
determinants of fragility, but the robustness of this link is clearly questionable. Settler mortality 
(column 5)  is also insignificant.  
 
Table 3. The determinants of fragility: colonial history  
 
Regressor  1 2 3 4 5 




























































































































British colony  -0,3736** 
(0,5096) 
    
French colony    0,3476* 
(0,5344) 
   
Portuguese colony      0,4266 
(0,8675) 
  
Political  status      -0,0591 
(0,3555) 
 
Settler  mortality       0,2418 
(0,5944) 
Mc Fadden R
2 0,50  0,49 0,48  0,52  0,53 
Adjusted R
2 0,23  0,22 0,21  0,22  0,11 
Observations  75 75 75 67 48 
Notes: Panet dataset. Probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 
10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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While in Table 3 we present a pooled specification, to increase the chances for the added variables 
to exert a significant impact, in unreported regressions we repeat the exercise running panel OLS 
with random country effects, with and without the period dummy, to find that the only significant 
colonial variable is British colony, while once again civil liberties and revolutions are confirmed, 
unlike growth and investment.
6 Similar results obtain when, in order to maximize the estimated 
sample size, the colonial variables are added to a more parsimonious specification including only 
those variables which are significant in the basic specification, i.e., the growth rate, investment, 
civil liberties and revolutions. Therefore, we can conclude that the additional explanatory power 
coming from the recognition of colonial history is limited and does not alter previous conclusions, 
possibly because the impact of these factors is already largely accounted for by the standard 
regressors, or else because their variability within SSA is limited. In a similar vein, Bhattacharyya 
(2009) also casts doubts on the ability of colonial legacy to explain African underdevelopment.  
 
 
Along the same lines of Table 3,  in Table 4 we add a number of additional covariates reflecting 
other possible channels of influence. In column 1 and 2 we add one by one two geographical 
variables, namely a country’s  latitude and a dummy reflecting the fact that a country is landlocked. 
They are both insignificant, and leave previous conclusions unaltered.
7 In columns 3, 4 and 5, we 
add one by one three of the Kaufmann et al. (2009) indexes, namely government effectiveness, rule 
of law, and voice and accountability. To be noticed is that these variables are highly correlated with 
fragility (-0.71, -0.61, -0.58, respectively), but at the same time they are also highly correlated with 
our institutional variables: their correlation coefficients with civil liberties are -0.63, -0.70, and -
0.92, respectively, while with revolutions they are  -0.54, -0.52, and -0.43. Unsurprisingly, in 
                                                 
6 To be noticed that country fixed effects are precluded by the time invariant nature of the colonial 
variables. 
7 When each of these variables is added to a more parsimonious specification including only those 
variables which are significant in the basic specification, i.e., the growth rate, investment, civil 
liberties and revolutions, they both show a significantly positive impact. This suggests that there 
may be a link between geography and fragility that runs through a wide array of channels.   17
column 3 government effectiveness appears highly significant but displaces the significance of   
revolutions, while rule of law in column 4 interferes both with revolutions and civil liberties, and 
voice and accountability replaces the role of civil liberties in column 5.  
 
 Table 4. The determinants of fragility: additional covariates  
 
Regressor  1 2 3 4 5 






























































































































    
Landlock   -0,3321 
(0,5835) 
   
Government 
effectiveness 
   -2,2111*** 
(1,8500) 
  
Rule of law        -1,0282*** 
(0,7134) 
 
Voice and  
accountability 
     -0,9273*** 
(0,8921) 
Mc Fadden R
2 0,48  0,48 0,75 0,58  0,53 
Adjusted R
2 0,21  0,21 0,48 0,31  0,26 
Observations  75 75 75 75 75 
Notes: Panet dataset. Probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 
10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Similar conclusions can be achieved in specifications including different combinations of the 
variables under consideration. This suggests that the set of variables under consideration captures 
the same phenomena, and that the relevance of institutions is robust to their alternative measures. 
 
 
3.3. Controlling for endogeneity 
 
While institutional variables emerge from the previous analysis as candidate explanations of 
fragility, it is conceivable that fragility, rather than being caused by bad institutions, may well be 
the cause behind them. The potential problem is mitigated by the fact that our dependend variable is 
constructed as the value of fragility in the final year of each cross section, so that the lagging of the 
regressors allows for some control of  reverse causality, which however cannot be ruled out under  
serial correlation in fragility. To address the issue, we first turn once again to colonial history as a 
source of possible instruments. However, this avenue is impeded by the fact that our colonial 
variables prove to be very weak instruments for all the variables we select as potentially significant, 
i.e., revolutions, civil liberties and GDP growth, as revealed by the first stages of  2SLS regressions 
we run. In particular, the fact that in our context settler mortality is an irrelevant instrument is 
probably to be attributed to the limited SSA sample we focus on. This evidence leads us to the 
conclusion that, within Africa, a strategy similar to that pursued by Acemoglu et al. (2001) cannot 
be applied, possibly because of insufficient cross country variation along the environmental 
dimension.  
 
An alternative solution for the endogeneity problem is to employ as instruments the lagged values 
of all regressors. The rationale is simply that this procedures at least ensures that the values of the 
regressors are determined prior to those of the dependent variable. Since our dataset only includes 
two subperiods, to avoid losing half of the observations we prefer to employ as instruments the 
values of all regressors  at the beginning of each subperiod, i.e., in 1992 and 2000, respectively. We   19
present the second stage of the estimates in Table 2, column 5, where we show that civil liberties 
and revolutions are the only residual significant variables, even if the precision of their estimated 
coefficient is partially reduced.
8 
To conclude, by addressing endogeneity we can conclude that, first, colonial history is not offering 
useful instruments and that, second, institutions, but not GDP growth or investment, are confirmed 
as exogenous determinants of fragility.  
 
3.4. A post-war perspective  
 
In the effort to find the long run roots of fragility, in this subsection we explore a further avenue, by 
focussing on the potential impact of the entire post-war period performance. Given the limited 
range of years over which information on fragility is available, so far we have been able to consider 
only a relatively short time period running from 1992 to 2007. To fully exploit the available 
information on our selected regressors, we assemble a new cross sectional dataset covering the 
same 41 countries from the year 1960. The dependent variable is constructed as the average of the 
fragility dummy in the 1999-2007 period. The regressors are the averages of the previously 
considered variables over the 1960-1998 period.
9 The resulting estimates therefore allow to evaluate 
the long run impact of the selected variables on the dependent variable. Implicitly, the new 
approach is less likely to suffer of the endogeneity problem, since the observations for the variables 
entered as regressors clearly predate those of the dependent variable.  
 
Since the dependent variable is no longer a binary variable, we perform OLS regressions which we 
present in Table 5, for the same specification presented in Table 2, columns 1 and 2.  
                                                 
8 Very similar results are obtained when only GDP growth, civil liberties and revolutions are 
instrumented with their initial values.  
 
9 Redefinitions of the time spans under consideration do not alter our results.   20
Table 5. The determinants of fragility: a post-war perspective  
 
Regressor  1 2 3 4 5 
constant 4,8961* 
(2,5136) 
4,8672*      
(2,6137) 
5,0595*      
(2,5678) 
5,3036*      
(2,6566) 
6,7350*      
(3,5121) 
pc GDP (log)  0,4616** 
(0,1842) 
0,4659**     
(0,1970) 
0,4357**     
(0,2079) 
0,5230***    
(0,1753) 
0,4660**     
(0,2168) 
pc GDP growth  -0,0561 
(0,0554) 
-0,0560       
(0,0568) 
-0,0496       
(0,0524) 
-0,0452       
(0,0523) 




0,0294*     
(0,0157) 
0,0289*     
(0,0164) 
0,0375*     
(0,0184) 
0,0407*     
(0,0228) 
Primary enrollment  -0,0002 
(0,0035) 
-0,0003     
(0,0038) 
0,0004     
(0,0039) 
3,1109e-06    
(0,0036) 






0,0048      
(0,0091) 
0,0037      
(0,0098) 
0,0112      
(0,0105) 




-0,0017      
(0,0040) 
-0,0017      
(0,0041) 
-0,0048      
(0,0041) 
-0,0071      
(0,0066) 
Inflation -6,3865e-05     
(0,0002) 
-6,1980e-05   
(0,0002) 
-3,0704e-05   
(0,0002) 
-3,6494e-06   
(0,0002) 
-4,5257e-05   
(0,0003) 
Life expectancy  -0,0333 
(0,0204) 
-0,0334     
(0,0210) 
-0,0341     
(0,0207) 
-0,0406*     
(0,0199) 
-0,0281     
(0,0232) 
Fertility rate (log)  -1,0497 
(1,0097) 
-1,0473      
(1,0390) 
-0,9908     
(1,0290) 
-1,2386       
(0,9992) 






0,0877     
(0,3811) 
0,0603    
(0,3689) 
0,1977   
(0,3990) 
0,2954      
(0,4733) 
Civil liberties  -1,9112 **    
(0,7217) 
-1,9155**     
(0,7366 ) 
-1,9469**     
(0,7606) 
-1,9697**     
(0,7926) 





0,1966**     
(0,0768) 
0,1987**     
(0,0788) 
0,1994**     
(0,0826) 




0,5132      
(0,4126) 
0,5766     
(0,4244) 
0,4460      
(0,4139) 
0,0747     
(0,4947) 
British colony    0,0136     
(0,1417) 
   
French colony      0,0869     
(0,1722) 
  
Portuguese colony        -0,3879      
(0,3326) 
 
Political status          -0,0254     
(0,1927) 
Adjusted R
2  0,27 0,23 0,24 0,29 0,18 
Observations  37 37 37 37 33 
Notes: Cross-sectional dataset. OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
We find evidence of a positive impact on fragility of income and investment. This confirms that 
fragility is not necessarily associated with worse economic performances. As for the reasons of this 
outcome, we can again conjecture that relatively favourable economic conditions can trigger   21
corruption and predation activities ultimately leading to fragility. Turning to institutions, we find 
that, over this longer time span, the impact of revolutions vanishes, possibly because revolutions 
represent a relatively short run, albeit acute symptom of bad institutions, or else because in some 
instances revolutions may clear the way to a more stable order. The impact of civil liberties is 
confirmed, which is not surprising given its relatively inertial dynamics. However, taking into 
account the entire post-colonial era, it becomes more complex, since it displays a convex behavior, 
which suggests that a higher degree of fragility is associated with extreme values of the index. In 
other words, fragility is more likely both under extreme autocracies and under very liberal 
democracies. A consequence of this finding it that a gradual improvement can be detrimental for 
growth.   The reason why even under the latter type of regime fragility is facilitated is that 
populistic governments may be unable to adopt beneficial but unpopular economic policies, with a 
consequent  increase in the risk of  political disorder. In the subsequent columns, we add one by one 
our colonial variables, which are never significant. The regression including settler mortality is 
omitted from the table since due to the small estimated sample size (24) none of the regressors 
reaches an acceptable level of precision. Additional unreported regressions confirm the irrelevancy 
of geographical variables. 
 
 
3.5.  Summary  
 
We can conclude our empirical investigations by pointing at institutions as the predominant cause 
of fragility. Purely economic factors such as the level of income, its growth rate, or investment, 
have a non robust impact on the dependent variable, and in some cases even run  in the direction of 
making fragility more likely under better economic performances. Colonial history, which we 
introduce by accounting both for the identity of the colonizers and for the environmental conditions 
in the colonies, appears to be only marginally relevant for fragility, once we control for 
contemporary institutions.   22
 
Our results can be compared with those obtained by Carment et al. (2008) over a cross sectional 
world sample of 156 countries covering the 1999-2005 period, despite the fact that they employ the  
CFIP rather that the CPIA  indicator for fragility. The main difference emerging from the their 
investigation is that, over their world sample, a lower per capita income level appears to be 
associated with higher fragility, while all other potential determinants lose significance once reverse 
causality is controlled for. This radically different conclusion can be explained by  the specificity of 
the African region, as suggested also by the positive coefficient of a dummy for Africa when the 
world sample is employed. We can also compare our results with Fosu (2008), who focuses like us 
on a SSA sample, but considers a different albeit related criterion to define his dependent variable, 
since he investigates the determinants of anti-growth policy syndromes. Among these syndromes, 
he includes the fragility-related concept of state breakdown, which is defined as a condition 
involving civil wars and acute political instability (Fosu and O’Connell, 2006). However, state 
breakdown is only one component, since policy syndromes are defined as combination of this 
symptom with state controls, adverse redistribution, and suboptimal inter-temporal resource 
allocation. Nonetheless, he finds that syndrome-free regimes are facilitated by a number of factors, 
among which the initial geo-political conditions, resource availability and political institutions.  
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
With a focus on SSA, we have explored the determinants of fragility by considering a wide array of 
potential factors. Besides economic, demographic, and institutional determinants, we have also 
considered the unique role of the history and geopraphy of the area. Our findings suggest that 
contemporary institutions are the central drivers of fragility.  
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Even if we find a limited role for colonial history, we cannot exclude that the institutional variables 
themselves may still be affected by long term factors that can even predate colonial dominations, as 
suggested by Herbst (2000), who focuses on the underdevelopment of  precolonial polities as an 
explanation of  the weakness of postcolonial states. Along the same lines, Bockstette et al. (2002) 
observe that state antiquity, a measure of the depth of experience with state level institutions, is 
positively correlated with institutional quality, while Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) uncover for 
Africa a positive association between stronger precolonial political institutions and public goods 
provision. Finally, Nunn (2008) finds that weakened and fragmented states may be the result of the 
slave trades. Further empirical research is needed on the link between fragility and these factors. 
 
While the literature we have surveyed is purely empirical, theoretical models of fragility have 
recently been proposed with a specific focus on the related fiscal concept of state capacity. Besley 
and Persson (2010) develop a model of state capacity which accounts for the risk of external or 
internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Acemoglu 
(2010) derives the political equilibrium of a model of state capacity. We can build on these 
contributions to develop a dynamic, political economy model of fragility, which can explain the 
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DATA APPENDIX  
Variable Description    Source 
Fragility 
Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
IDA countries in the bottom two 
CPIA quintiles or without a CPIA 
rating, 0 otherwise 
World Bank and Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2009) 
 
pc GDP  Real per capita GDP  Penn World Table 6.2 
 
pc GDP growth  Annual growth rate of real per capita 
GDP 
Penn World Table 6.2 
 
Investment  Investment over  real GDP  Penn World Table 6.2 
Primary 
enrollment 
Primary enrollment over official 
school age population  




Government expenditures over real 
GDP 




Sum of import and export over real 
GDP  
Penn World Table 6.2 
Inflation Consumer  price  index  International Monetary Fund  
Life expectancy  Number of years of life expectancy 
at birth  
Cross-National Time Series (2001) 
Fertility rate  Number of children per woman  World Bank World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization  Ethnic fractionalization index   Alesina et al. (2003) 
Civil liberties  Civil liberties index  Freedom House (2008) 
Revolutions  Number of revolutions   Cross-National Time Series (2001) 
British colony  Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
former British colonies, 0 otherwise 
 
African Research Program 
 
French colony  Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
former French colonies, 0 otherwise 




Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
former Portuguese colonies, 0 
otherwise 
African Research Program 
 
Political status 
Categorical variable assuming value 
2 for colonies, 1 for dependencies, 
and 0 for independent countries 
Bertocchi and Canova (2002) 
Settler mortality  Settler mortality rate  Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Latitude  Absolute value of  latitude  
Center for International 
Development and  The World 
Factbook  2008   29
Landlock  
Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
countries with no access to the sea, 0 
otherwise 




effectiveness  Government effectiveness index   Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Rule of law  Rule of law index   Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Voice and 
accountability  Voice and accountability index  
Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
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